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Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots
CHRISTOPHER M. SCHNAUBELT

From Parameters, Summer 1997, pp. 88-109.
"Police officers responded to a domestic dispute, accompanied by marines. They had just gone up to the
door when two shotgun birdshot rounds were fired through the door, hitting the officers. One yelled `cover
me!' to the marines, who then laid down a heavy base of fire. . . . The police officer had not meant `shoot'
when he yelled `cover me' to the marines. [He] meant . . . point your weapons and be prepared to respond
if necessary. However, the marines responded instantly in the precise way they had been trained, where
`cover me' means provide me with cover using firepower. . . . over two hundred bullets [were] fired into
that house."[1]

Operations other than war (OOTW) present numerous challenges to leaders instilled with a doctrine principally
designed for fighting Soviet-style armies during large-scale conventional wars.[2] Some of these missions (e.g.,
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation assistance) pose doctrinal problems due to what has been described as
"the American proclivity for satisfying political decisions by using conventional military forces to produce effects that
are foreign to their nature."[3]
In other instances, the term OOTW presents a doctrinal challenge because the domestic activities that were once
among the Army's prominent missions, such as quelling riots or performing disaster relief, had been receiving short
shrift in deference to warfighting. The notion that killing people and breaking things should be the US Army's sole
concern is a relatively recent development; one need only note the role of the Army in putting down Shay's rebellion
in 1786-87 as well as its many other noncombat operations in the 19th and 20th centuries. Since it is unlikely that US
policymakers will soon stop asking the military to perform tasks for which it is not presently designed, an
understanding of the differences between war and operations other than war may help leaders primarily trained for
high-intensity combat to adapt to the particular demands of other military operations.
This article examines two attributes of operations other than war that are likely to influence command and control and
thus affect directly the outcome of the mission: the absence of an obvious continuum or linear relationship between the
strategic, operational, and tactical consequences of action, and the requirement for interagency coordination even at
relatively low echelons. The article uses the 1992 Los Angeles riots to illustrate some of the unique characteristics of
this type of mission: the situation was "amorphous and ambiguous," the use of force was greatly restrained,
coordination with nonmilitary entities was often required at battalion and lower echelons, and political considerations
governed military actions at even the individual level.[4]
Doctrine
The Army's operational doctrine is contained in FM 100-5, Operations, published in 1993; it is presently under
revision as the Army continues to adapt to the conditions and requirements of our time. Chapter 13 of the manual,
"Operations Other Than War," identifies the activities included in such operations. One of the activities--support to
domestic authorities--is clearly limited in scope; the other, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, addresses the
Army's responsibilities to support both domestic and international emergencies.
A companion doctrinal publication, Domestic Support Operations, also appeared in 1993. It provides considerable
information to commanders and staffs for carrying out tasks associated with the four recognized forms of domestic
support: disaster assistance, environmental assistance, community assistance, and support to law enforcement. The
material is based on the applicable federal statutes; matters addressed in the publication include the roles and

responsibilities of the branches of government and specific federal agencies, interagency coordination, principles for
conducting the operations, and legal considerations and constraints.
By the time these two documents appeared, the Army had just completed two operations in support of domestic
authorities: support of law enforcement in the Los Angeles riots and disaster assistance to the victims of Hurricane
Andrew. The former, the subject of this article, occurred in late April and early May 1992. The latter involved the 10th
Mountain Division and other units of the active and reserve components for several months starting in August of the
same year. Some of the lessons learned from those missions undoubtedly made their way into the emerging doctrine.
Some, however, may not have been considered. It is these lessons that this article develops in detail.[5]
The Los Angeles Riots in Brief
The Los Angeles (LA) riots were the most destructive civil disturbance in US history, causing the deaths of at least 54
people and more than $800 million in property damage throughout LA County.[6] More than 10,000 troops from the
California National Guard (CANG), 2000 active component soldiers, and 1500 Marines were deployed to the area at
the height of operations. The LA riots provide an important case study to illustrate some of the unique characteristics
of domestic operations other than war.
The military response to the LA riots is also noteworthy because active component and National Guard troops served
together in a single joint command. Furthermore, CANG troops served first in a state status (under the command of the
governor), were subsequently federalized (placed under the active component chain of command), and then reverted to
state control. See Figure 1 below for a brief chronology of key events in the crisis.

Chronology of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots
Acquittal verdicts announced in the trial of police officers accused of beating Rodney King.
29 1515
April

1850

Rioters beat and nearly kill truck driver Reginald Denny as a television crew captures both the horror of the incident and the
absence of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers. Hundreds of arson and looting incidents begin.

2100

The California governor's office informs the adjutant general that the governor has decided to mobilize (call to state active duty)
2000 California National Guard (CANG) troops at the request of the LA mayor.
A dusk-to-dawn curfew is imposed in large portions of the city of LA and the surrounding county.

30
April

-

Approximately 2000 CANG soldiers have reported to armories.
0400
Los Angeles County requests 2000 more CANG personnel; the governor approves the request.
1100
Ammunition from Camp Roberts (in central California) arrives in LA area via CH-47 helicopter.
1350
The first CANG elements (two military police companies) deploy in support of the LAPD and the LA Sheriff's Department
1435 (LASD).

About 1000 CANG troops are currently deployed "on the street," with more than 1000 more prepared to deploy and awaiting
2000 mission requests from law enforcement agencies.
LAPD and LASD request 2000 additional CANG troops, for a total of 6000.
2356
Perceiving the CANG deployment to be too slow, the governor requests federal troops.
1
0100
May
The President agrees to deploy 4000 federal troops to LA.
0515
Approximately 1220 CANG soldiers are deployed in support of LAPD; 1600 are deployed in support of LASD; and 2700 are in
0630 reserve awaiting missions.
Active component Marines from Camp Pendleton, California, begin arriving in the LA area via convoy.
1430
Commander, Joint Task Force-Los Angeles (JTF-LA) arrives in LA area.
1630
Active component soldiers from Ft. Ord, California, begin arriving in the LA area via C-141 aircraft.
1730
The President announces that the CANG will be federalized.
1800
Final plane with active component soldiers arrives.
2
0400
May
Approximately 6150 CANG troops are deployed on the street, with 1000 more in reserve; 1850 soldiers from the 7th Infantry
1100 Division are in staging areas; Marines prepare for deployment.
First active component troops deploy on the street; a battalion of Marines replaces 600 CANG soldiers.
1900
More than 6900 CANG soldiers are deployed, with 2700 more in reserve. Approximately 600 Marines are deployed, but most
2359 active component Army and Marine Corps personnel remain in staging areas.
CANG reverts to state status, ending federalization; active component forces begin redeploying home.
9
1200
May
CANG releases troops from state active duty, returning them to "part-time" status.
13-27
May

-

Source: Compiled from Harrison (1992), Delk (1995), and various CANG after-action reports.

Figure 1. Chronology of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots.

The Political Context
The LA riots erupted on 29 April 1992 after a jury acquitted four LA police officers accused in the beating of Rodney
King, a black motorist who, while driving under the influence of alcohol, had led California Highway Patrol and Los
Angeles Police Department officers on a high-speed chase and subsequently attempted to assault the arresting officers.
The jury, as described by journalist Joe Domanick, was selected from "the nearly lily-white" community of Simi
Valley and consisted of "ten whites, one Hispanic woman, one Filipino woman, and no blacks. Zero."[7] The
acquittals stunned the public, which had been conditioned to believe that a guilty verdict was inevitable as the media
relentlessly played an excerpt of a video tape, taken by a bystander, showing several white police officers beating a
prone and apparently helpless Rodney King with their batons.[8]
The riots probably began about four miles from Watts, the neighborhood where riots had occurred in 1965.[9] The
verdicts were announced at 1515 hours. About 45 minutes later, an unruly crowd had formed at the intersection of
Florence and Normandie avenues. Police were called at approximately 1630. When officers arrived, a mob was
assaulting pedestrians, pelting vehicles with bricks and rocks, and smashing shop windows. Rather than call for
emergency backup and immediately arrest the boldest troublemakers, the police retreated from the trouble spot.
"Where were the police?" asked the Los Angeles Times the following day.[10] In truth, the riots might have been
averted had police responded with a massive effort to quell the initial unrest. For various reasons however, the LAPD
was unprepared to deal with the rising civil disturbance. Most of the department's senior leaders were 40 miles north of
the city attending a training seminar when the verdicts were announced. The chief was out of the office attending a
political fund-raiser. Several of the department's most senior officers, as well as the chief and the city's mayor, were
not on speaking terms with each other as a result of partisan bickering and political maneuvers.[11]
Shortly after the assaults on bystanders began at Florence and Normandie, scenes of the chaos in LA were being
broadcast live across the nation. One of the most abhorrent images was captured by a news helicopter: Reginald Denny
being dragged from the cab of his truck, knocked to the ground and kicked by several men, then struck in the head
with a fire extinguisher, several times with a hammer, and finally a brick. Local authorities were clearly overwhelmed.
The National Guard Responds
At approximately 2100 hours on 29 April, the governor ordered the mobilization of 2000 troops from the California
National Guard. The CANG's 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (hereafter identified as "the division") was given
the mission and directed to draw on units located closest to the area. About five hours later, units from the CANG's
49th Military Police (MP) Brigade were mobilized and attached to the division.[12] Although the MPs were more
appropriately equipped and trained for civil disturbances than soldiers assigned to a mechanized infantry division, they
were located in the northern part of the state, more than 400 miles by air from Los Angeles. The unexpected nature of
the emergency caused the CANG leadership to deploy the closest units first.
It was obvious that the soldiers had to be assembled as quickly as possible and that they would ultimately be deployed
to the streets, yet their mission, including identification of the agencies they were to support, remained uncertain, as
the following circumstances suggest:
CANG leadership did not have a deployment timeline establishing when troops would be available on the streets.
Law enforcement agencies expecting military support did not know when to expect troops to arrive.
Law enforcement agencies did not know where they wanted the troops to be deployed nor exactly what the
soldiers should do once they appeared. It had been a very long time since law enforcement leaders had seriously
considered the possibility that the military might be required to help them in quelling a civil disturbance. When
the crisis came, military support arrangements would be mostly ad hoc.
California National Guard staff officers had regularly attended state interagency coordination meetings prior to the

riots. This involvement, however, was primarily to plan for military support in case of an earthquake. Although civilian
agencies anticipated the potential for violence as a result of the Rodney King incident, they were certain that civilian
law enforcement would be capable of dealing with the unrest. Civilian and military leaders alike were convinced that
the National Guard would not be required in the event of a civil disturbance. Personnel from the California Office of
Emergency Services (OES), the agency responsible for coordinating statewide response to emergencies too large for
local governments to handle, went so far as to assure CANG planners informally that "on-the-street" civil disturbance
support from the National Guard would not be required.[13] So, instead of planning for the use of its own troops, the
CANG loaned out several thousand of its flak vests, Kevlar helmets, and gas mask filters to the LAPD and area fire
departments.
Yet even if CANG leaders had concluded otherwise--that military civil disturbance operations were likely--they would
have had difficulty intervening in police planning processes. Law enforcement agencies in the Los Angeles area were
the presumed experts regarding the potential for riots and the ability of civilian agencies to respond. Furthermore, the
military role in civil disturbance operations is to support rather than take the lead; military forces are deployed only at
the request of the appropriate civil authorities. If civilian leaders did not think that military support would be necessary,
the CANG had no leverage to cause them to incorporate military support into their emergency plans. The CANG's
leaders were not in a position to second-guess the police or elected officials.
Disinterest from civilian agencies, however, did not prevent the CANG from planning for possible deployment and
conducting internal exercises of its own plans. In 1990, the CANG had revised its civil disturbance strategy to rely
primarily on the 49th Military Police Brigade, located in the San Francisco area. The five infantry battalions of the
division would be tasked to provide additional forces if necessary. Yet once the strategy had been revised, there was no
follow-up to ensure that operations plans were adjusted, nor were designated units required to conduct annual civil
disturbance training and procure the associated equipment.[14] Moreover, several of the strategy's unstated
assumptions did not hold: the LA riots were considerably larger than those posed in the CANG exercises, and the
CANG had far less time to mobilize and deploy than planners had foreseen.
The widespread belief that military support for civil disturbance operations was a Vietnam-era anachronism reinforced
the desire of CANG leaders to downplay this particular state mission, a belief fostered by the realities of resource
allocation.[15] Severe post-Cold War budget and force-structure reductions threatened the National Guard; many of its
leaders believed that its fate depended on demonstrating combat readiness. In the belief that resources used for state
missions might be perceived as detracting from training for the National Guard's federal warfighting mission, CANG
leaders hoped to minimize cuts in size and funding by focusing on the federal mission.[16]
Another significant reason for the assumption that the CANG would not be needed rested on a system of mutual aid
among California law enforcement agencies. (Similar agreements also applied to fire departments and other emergency
services). The concept of mutual aid was that if a particular sheriff or police department became overwhelmed by local
events, the state Office of Emergency Services would coordinate the dispatch of reinforcements from other
jurisdictions. According to mutual aid "doctrine," the CANG would not be called upon until all available law
enforcement resources had been committed. This assumption apparently acquired over time the force of a decision; it
led to the reasonable belief that even if the CANG had to be mobilized, the time it would take to absorb mutual aid
assets would be ample for the CANG to assemble, equip, and deploy troops. Absolutely no one, civilian or military,
expected a situation wherein the National Guard would be needed on the streets in a matter of hours. As things turned
out, however, the governor, possibly under the pressure caused by live TV broadcasts of assaults and damage,
mobilized the CANG before mutual aid had been fully implemented.
Unfortunately, during the LA riots the mutual aid system did not operate as planned. The LAPD had traditionally
avoided participation in the system for fear that it would always be the source of the support. Additionally, a fierce
culture of independence had been deeply ingrained within the department's leadership, to the degree that its leaders
routinely refused to plan and coordinate emergency response with other agencies: it was inconceivable that the LAPD
would ever require outside assistance. As late as midnight the first night of the riots, Chief Daryl Gates doubted the
need to deploy the CANG, telling a television news reporter that he "didn't want to be taking orders from a
general."[17] The lack of mutual aid planning within LAPD undoubtedly hampered the incorporation of additional law
enforcement officers once they arrived from other jurisdictions and may also have increased the pressure for a rapid

CANG deployment.
Two other invalid assumptions affected decisions that day. The first was the likely nature of potential unrest. The idea
of civil disturbance apparently held by most military and civilian planners was the well-organized and comparatively
non-violent Vietnam War protests of the late 1960s and early 1970s, in which crowd control was the primary
requirement. The second related to the scope of the disturbance. The city's previous experience with large-scale
violence--the Watts riots in 1965--was confined to a relatively small area of about 60 square blocks. The 1992 LA
riots were spread across hundreds of square miles.
The values on which these assumptions were based influenced conclusions about the likely form and scope of potential
unrest; the outcome was that police and soldiers alike had prepared "to fight the last war" instead of the one they
would actually confront.[18] Even after the anarchic nature of the 1992 riots became apparent--widespread looting and
plunder rather than localized protest--both the National Guard and active component troops spent hours training in the
"stomp and drag" crowd control techniques prescribed in Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances.[19] These crowd
control formations and techniques were virtually never used during the LA riots.
2100 on 29 April to 1435 on 30 April
National Guard units mobilized quickly once the governor issued the order to do so. By 0400 hours on 30 April,
approximately seven hours later, some 2000 soldiers of the division had reported to armories in the Los Angeles
area.[20] At least several hundred more troops whose units had not yet been mobilized, such as those of the division's
2d Brigade (located 100 miles to the south in the San Diego area), reported to their armories on their own initiative
after viewing news reports of the riots. Although the mobilization of the first 2000 soldiers was proceeding rapidly, the
division commander anticipated the need for additional troops and placed the entire division on alert.
While the response of individual soldiers was superb, failure to plan for, coordinate, and exercise the mobilization of
troops to support civil disturbance operations produced severe difficulties in two key functions: command and control,
and logistics. Following mobilization, the California adjutant general told the LAPD chief of police and the LA County
sheriff that it would take about seven hours for the 2000 troops to be "mobilized in armories."[21] While the estimate
accurately stated the time to assemble soldiers for duty, it significantly understated the time it would take to have
troops in position and prepared for deployment onto the streets, which turned out to be approximately 17 hours.
Local law enforcement and CANG officials also held very different expectations about the timing of the CANG
deployment. The police and sheriffs expected troops on the street first thing in the morning of 30 April. Conversely,
senior CANG leaders apparently expected that all law enforcement assets would be committed first in accordance with
mutual aid procedures, and that troops would not be deployed until the evening, a conclusion that might have been
conditioned by the 1965 experience in Watts, when rioting occurred primarily at night.
Very few soldiers had received civil disturbance training within the previous year, which in turn concealed the scope of
the logistics problems awaiting their commanders. Most units did not have face shields and riot batons on hand, and
the lock plates required to prevent an M-16 rifle from firing in the full-automatic mode were not available in quantity
at most unit armories.[22] The required training was conducted while units waited in their armories--and later in
reserve locations around Los Angeles--for missions to be assigned and for munitions and riot control equipment to
arrive.
A detailed look at the most significant single challenge during this period, the movement and distribution of munitions,
highlights the need for contingency planning and the ensuing rehearsal and training of all stakeholders--civilian as well
as military in this case--in any common mission. A decision made several months before the riots led to the removal
of unit security ammunition from the CANG's armories and its consolidation at Camp Roberts, in central California,
approximately 250 miles north of Los Angeles. The decision was based on logistical and security challenges associated
with maintaining the ammunition in dozens of small armories around the state: storage under very restrictive
conditions, constant rotation with training stocks, and strict accountability through frequent physical inventories.
Under these circumstances, and given the assumptions discussed previously, moving the ammunition to Camp Roberts
seemed to be an efficient use of resources. Staff planners believed that if the ammunition were ever needed, a

helicopter could deliver it to mobilization locations before troops had to deploy. Sending a helicopter to pick up and
distribute the ammunition, however, turned out to be neither simple nor quick. A detailed plan for the emergency
movement of munitions had not been written, nor had the mission ever been assigned to an aviation unit or rehearsed.
As soldiers began to mobilize, staff at the CANG headquarters estimated that the ammunition could be picked up at
0600 hours and delivered to the division headquarters in Los Alamitos, about 30 miles south of Los Angeles, no later
than 0800. Without advance notice, a CH-47 flight crew from a unit located in Stockton, California, about 200 miles
northeast of Camp Roberts (and some 450 air miles north of Los Angeles) was alerted at home at approximately 0120
hours; their helicopter arrived at Camp Roberts at 0620. For various reasons, most of which might have been avoided
if the procedure had been rehearsed, the helicopter did not depart Camp Roberts until 0945:
The helicopter flew to the main helipad to refuel instead of directly to the ammunition supply point.
The ammunition was moved by truck to the helipad and did not arrive until 0715.
The aircrew was not familiar with palletized cargo and did not bring rollers, so the cargo had to be loaded
manually.
Once the pallets had been loaded, several had to be off-loaded and broken open so that obsolete lots of CS
grenades could be removed, then re-banded and reloaded onto the CH-47.
The difficulties in getting the ammunition out of Camp Roberts could largely be blamed on inexperience and
incomplete staff work. Unfortunately, the next set of delays might be attributed to officers who seemed to consider the
riots to be a training event rather than an emergency.
In order to save expensive helicopter blade hours, after departing Camp Roberts the aircraft was diverted by a
logistics staff officer to fly to Camp San Luis Obispo (located approximately 50 miles to the south) and pick up
additional riot equipment, such as face shields, flak vests, and batons.
Personnel at Camp San Luis Obispo decided to offload some of the munitions to make room for the equipment.
At Camp San Luis Obispo, the helicopter was directed to wait for M-16 lock plates to arrive from Sharp Army
Depot.
The CH-47 finally departed San Luis Obispo at approximately 1230 and arrived at the division headquarters in Los
Alamitos at 1350. The deployment problems created by the unexpectedly slow movement of the ammunition were
exacerbated by the absence of communication between the relevant headquarters: neither the governor's office, nor the
adjutant general, nor the division commander at Los Alamitos had been informed of the delays.[23] By comparison, it
is standard procedure in California to send along a second aircraft as a backup when the adjutant general travels by
helicopter. Ammunition for the civil disturbance operation already in progress apparently did not rate the same level of
consideration.
The ammunition snafu probably added between two and five hours to the CANG's deployment. Even had the
munitions arrived on schedule, the absence of pre-riot coordination meant that the pace of CANG deployment
inevitably would have been slowed by the need to determine the support requirements of law enforcement
organizations, tasks appropriate for military personnel, and assembly locations for the arriving units. As the munitions
were en route, unit leaders conducted reconnaissance and units received refresher training in handling civil
disturbances. With the munitions on hand, CANG troops became available to accept missions at 1435 hours on 30
April, approximately 17 hours after the governor had mobilized the National Guard.
The unexpected delay in getting ammunition to the troops was not the only procedure that might have been
accomplished more efficiently, but by its nature, it was largely responsible for the widespread perception of poor initial
performance by the CANG. This is unfortunate, for it called into question the meritorious efforts by many of
California's citizen-soldiers and airmen in reporting for duty--some even before called--and performing their jobs in an
exemplary manner through the entire operation.
1435 on 30 April to 0515 on 1 May
Within a few hours of the governor's order to mobilize, the CANG had established an operations cell at the LA County
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to receive law enforcement support requests, obtain mission approval from the

deputy adjutant general, and assign mission taskings to the division. Mutual aid doctrine and California OES
procedures called for municipal requests for military support from law enforcement organizations to be submitted
through the county's senior law enforcement official, the sheriff. The city of Los Angeles, however, insisted on
bypassing the county level and sending requests directly to the CANG.
This situation posed a dilemma for CANG officials: how could they prioritize requests from the county of Los Angeles
without a single point of contact to establish priorities for all law enforcement organizations in the county?[24] The
absence of a unified law enforcement chain of command or other means of coordination meant that by default the
National Guard was required to make decisions that were the responsibility of either law enforcement or political
leaders. The LAPD liaison officer at the county Emergency Operations Center continued to request literally hundreds
of troops without having specific missions for them. The LA sheriff's department, meanwhile, requested far fewer
troops and did so only with immediate taskings in mind. Because the sheriff's liaison officer was receiving all the
soldiers his department could employ, he told the CANG informally that it was all right to give the lion's share to the
LAPD.
Perhaps the LAPD was requesting troops as a wise precaution; some CANG leaders, however, felt they were either
trying to shift blame or cover unlikely contingencies. While this situation was evolving, hundreds of California
Highway Patrol officers--who according to the mutual aid concept should have been deployed long before the CANG-sat in a staging area in Los Alamitos with nothing to do. They were eventually assigned to protect fire trucks en route
to emergencies.
By the time munitions had been distributed, hundreds of troops had deployed to reserve areas waiting for missions.
While senior military and police leaders struggled to establish mission tasking procedures, unit commanders within
each area of operations were aggressively seeking opportunities to provide support. During the night of 1 May, for
example, Colonel Richard Metcalf, the 2d Brigade commander, personally visited the three police stations in his area
of operations to look for business for his soldiers. Other brigade and battalion commanders coordinated directly with
their law enforcement counterparts to explain military capabilities and identify support requirements.
The CANG operations cell and the division headquarters did not provide specific mission taskings to units. The task
actually sent from the division to its subordinate or attached units was to report to a specific law enforcement agency
at a particular location and provide the support requested. As MP companies and battalion-sized infantry and armor
units became available, they were assigned to support specific law enforcement jurisdictions and authorized to accept
specific taskings directly from the senior police official in the jurisdiction.[25] Typically, a CANG battalion
commander and an LAPD area commander worked together to determine how many soldiers were available, how
many to send to each location, and what tasks the troops would perform once they arrived.[26]
A judgment that the civil disturbance was occurring within a "non-linear" operational area precluded the establishment
of unit boundaries by the division staff. Military unit areas of operations were instead designated to coincide with the
jurisdiction or area of responsibility of the law enforcement agency or police station receiving support. This sort of
direct coordination between mid-level law enforcement leaders and supporting military units greatly improved what
was at best an ad hoc process for requesting and approving military support to local police.
Each unit commander and the senior supported law enforcement officer would jointly determine which specific tasks
the military unit would perform: e.g., operate traffic control checkpoints, escort fire trucks, perform site security. Once
coordinated, the specific tasks and locations chosen were reported through military channels to the CANG operations
cell. Although not explicitly stated, the procedure for approving the specific tasks assigned to CANG units through this
process was the principle that silence from the higher headquarters constituted consent to the proposed mission.
Once military and law enforcement leaders initiated face-to-face contact, the deployment of troops proceeded
smoothly, if slowly, aided by the CANG's experience in providing counterdrug support. Counterdrug operations require
the same degree of close coordination with the supported law enforcement organization that was expected in supporting
police officials in LA County. Prior to the riots, the officer in charge of the CANG operations cell, Colonel (now
Brigadier General) Edmund Zysk, had approved hundreds of law enforcement requests for military counterdrug
support. Consequently, the CANG's leadership had already addressed and felt comfortable with many of the legal and

procedural issues concerning aid to law enforcement. These were the same issues that would later slow
decisionmaking by senior officials in the headquarters of all federalized troops, Joint Task Force-Los Angeles (JTFLA).[27]
Even as elected officials were appealing publicly for more soldiers, the CANG was pushing soldiers out to support LA
area law enforcement agencies more quickly than the police could absorb them. The CANG never managed to
convince the governor and the mayor of Los Angeles that troop deployments were on track; apparently expecting a
conspicuous military presence immediately after the governor's decision to call troops to state active duty, Mayor Tom
Bradley quickly demanded federal troops. His request came not as a result of prodding by local law enforcement
officials, but through the influence of former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who was a well-connected private
citizen at the time. In an apparent surrender to politics and the images on national TV screens, Governor Wilson
agreed to ask for help from the federal government. Yet even as the governor's office was phoning Washington,
approximately 1000 CANG troops were standing by, equipped and ready to respond to requests for support from local
law enforcement officials.
JTF-LA and the Consequences of Federalizing the National Guard
The mission of Joint Task Force-Los Angeles, formed as a consequence of the decision to deploy 4000 federal troops
to Los Angeles, was "to restore law and order." But as subsequently pointed out by Major General James Delk, the
CANG's deputy adjutant general, that mission "had been accomplished before [active component forces] arrived."[28]
For various reasons, the riots were essentially over by the time JTF-LA was established and active component troops
began arriving during the night of 1 May. Besides the fact that the erstwhile looters were simply becoming tired as
well as running out of things readily available to steal or burn, the largest single factor in quelling the riots was
probably the imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew after the first night of rioting. The curfew, combined with the
presence of more than 4000 CANG troops, 5000 LAPD officers, and about 4000 additional police officers from
agencies across the state, helped to discourage most rioters after the first 36 hours of rampage.
As active component forces arrived, the JTF-LA headquarters began the process of assuming command of all military
forces deployed for the riots. The CANG operations cell, not realizing it had been federalized, continued to receive
and approve missions and task CANG units until the morning of 2 May. Once JTF-LA assumed full responsibility for
all federal troops in the operation, including the CANG, its priority task became that of centralizing command and
control of all deployed forces.
The JTF established two subordinate commands, one each for Army and Marine forces. The commander of the 40th
Infantry Division (Mechanized), Major General Daniel Hernandez, was designated to command the Army forces.[29]
Geographic boundaries between deployed CANG units and arriving federal units were hastily--and arbitrarily--drawn.
Areas of operations were assigned to the division's major subordinate commands and to Marine forces; the latter
deployed only one battalion in what seemed to be a mostly symbolic commitment. In the context of that brief
description of events related to the arrival of active component forces, here are some of the more significant changes
that followed federalization of the CANG and the establishment of JTF-LA.

. Freeways were the feature used most often by the JTF as boundaries. Although they provided a readily identifiable
line on a map and were easily located on the ground, the freeways had no political or operational relevance. As a
result, brigade- and battalion-sized units had to change from the earlier procedure of supporting a single police
jurisdiction to providing support to several police areas and operations bureaus. In some cases, the change caused units
to operate in more than one city.
The effects were comparable from the police perspective. Leaders of police areas and bureaus, who previously had
only one military counterpart, now were typically supported by multiple units and were thus required to coordinate
with more than one military headquarters. In retrospect, a more effective means of assigning boundaries would have
been to continue to match military units to the jurisdictional boundaries of the law enforcement entities they were
supporting, as had been done initially by the National Guard.[30]

. The CANG's procedure for approving law enforcement requests had been rapid and gave maximum discretion to
subordinate commanders to coordinate directly with the supported law enforcement entities. Before the establishment
of JTF-LA and the federalization of the CANG, virtually 100 percent of law enforcement support requests had been
approved. Following federalization, only about 20 percent were approved.[31]
The substantial reduction in military support following federalization is frequently attributed to legal restrictions
imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (United States Code, Title 18, Section 1385), commonly referred to as
Posse Comitatus. This belief, however, is erroneous. The Presidential Executive Order of 1 May provided JTF-LA the
authority to "restore law and order," which included the performance of law enforcement activities; Posse Comitatus
therefore could not limit the military's options in this circumstance. Nevertheless, the JTF-LA commander's mission
analysis concluded that his essential tasks did not include the requirement to maintain law and order. According to
Major General Marvin Covault, the JTF commander, "It was not the military's mission to solve Los Angeles's crime
problem, nor were we trained to do so."[32] The police, the public, and the media, however, expected the military to
keep the peace rather than disengage quickly.
In his report concerning the military and law enforcement response to the LA riots (The Webster Report), former
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Judge William Webster wrote:
It [JTF-LA] required each request for assistance to be subjected to a nebulous test to determine whether
the requested assignment constituted a law enforcement or a military function. As a result, after the
federalization on May 1 . . . not only were the federal troops rendered largely unavailable for most
assignments requested by the LAPD, but the National Guard, under federal command, was made subject to
the same restrictions, and therefore had to refuse many post-federalization requests for help.[33]

. The JTF established liaison teams at each of the four LAPD operations bureaus and at the City of Los Angeles
emergency operations center to coordinate requests for military support. The CANG operations cell already operating
at the LA County Emergency Operations Center was converted to a JTF liaison headquarters and tasked with collating
LAPD support requests with support requests from the LA sheriff's department and from cities other than LA. Mission
support requests were subsequently transmitted from the county Emergency Operations Center to the JTF-LA
headquarters in Los Alamitos for review by the commander and staff.
Each new request for support was reviewed by the JTF-LA commander, the operations officer, and the staff judge
advocate. The definition of what constituted a support mission, however, remained vague. Some activities reported as
single missions troops operating in several locations and conducting a combination of mobile patrols and fixed-point
security tasks, such as security for a shopping mall. In other instances, the security of four intersections within a few
blocks of each other was reported as four separate missions. The level of detail was such that a mission request to
station an infantry squad at an intersection had to indicate the exact corner on which the unit would be located; moving
across the street was considered a change in mission and required a new approval process.
Obtaining approval for a new mission or a change in a previous mission was a slow process under the control of JTFLA. An average request for support required from six to eight hours from the time it was transmitted from one of the
LAPD bureaus (to the liaison cell at the county Emergency Operations Center) until approval or disapproval was
received by the executing battalion. Added to this processing time was the time devoted to generating the mission
request, which typically involved the coordinated effort of a military battalion commander and a senior police officer.
Each previously approved mission also required daily revalidation, which also was a change in procedures. Liaison
officers were required to determine which missions the police wanted continued--not surprisingly, the answer was
almost always "all of them"--and then report this information to the JTF-LA cell at the county Emergency Operations
Center and wait to find out if any previously approved missions had been disapproved since the last inquiry. The
revalidation process often took longer than obtaining permission for new missions. In several instances approved
missions still requested by police were not performed because the unit performing them did not realize the missions
were still approved.

A more expeditious approval process would have been to designate approved mission types and tell law enforcement
agencies which activities the military could perform without specific approval from higher headquarters.[34] In this
system, a request for support would include the mission type, supported agency, and general location. (The number of
troops required would be determined by the military liaison officer or supporting unit commander in coordination with
law enforcement.) Once the JTF commander had determined that it would be appropriate for the military to provide
site security--for shopping malls, for example--as long as assets remained available, there would be no need to specify
which malls would be protected. Then if the supported law enforcement agency, in conjunction with the supporting
unit commander, decided to shift from protecting one mall to protecting another across the street, the change could be
made without requesting approval from JTF headquarters.
The CANG recognized that the absence of mission approval criteria was the major impediment to efficient allocation
of resources during the riots. Anticipating both the CANG's return to state control and the potential for future civil
unrest, on 7 and 8 May a joint task force of military and law enforcement personnel established by the CANG
analyzed the types of support missions the military might be asked to perform and the circumstances under which such
missions would be appropriate. The task force's product is in Figure 2, below.[35]
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11. Employ riot control agents

12. Provide VIP protection, escort

13. Provide reserve, quick-reaction force

14. Joint patrols, ride-alongs

15. Other missions mutually agreed upon

INAPPROPRIATE
1. Hostage negotiation

2. Barricaded suspect

3. Evidentiary searches

4. Criminal investigation

Figure 2. Civil Disturbance Mission Tasking Guidelines.

. Prior to federalization, the CANG readily deployed troops in numbers tailored to mission requirements. Soldiers were
frequently deployed in squads, and noncommissioned officers were expected to perform their jobs. Guidance from
JTF-LA, however, emphasized control: units were to deploy in formations of at least platoon size with an officer in
charge at all times. This requirement often meant that a mission that previously called for two squads would thereafter
require two platoons so that an officer could be present with the soldiers during each 12-hour shift. Once JTF-LA
realized that retroactively imposing the new requirement would have required a large effort to shift resources to dozens
of ongoing squad-size missions, the guidance was modified to apply only to new deployments. However, the JTF
headquarters reviewed squad missions daily and encouraged subordinate headquarters to increase the size of the force
conducting them as soon as practical.
Since the JTF-LA mission effectively had been accomplished before its arrival, the commander's priority shifted
quickly to removing federal forces from the area. Even in the best of circumstances, the process would have been
problematic because it meant weaning LA area law enforcement from the military presence to which they had rapidly
become accustomed. By the fourth day after troops had deployed, the crime rate had dropped below its usual level by
more than half.[36] Gang violence had nearly disappeared, as rumors of a truce between the Crips and Bloods
circulated on the streets. Both the police and the public felt safer with the military present; no one was eager to see the
troops leave.

The initial JTF-LA approach to disengagement was to have its liaison officers try to talk the supported law
enforcement agencies into canceling some of their ongoing missions. This tactic was unsuccessful because it ran
counter to the advantages that JTF-LA provided to law enforcement leaders; the latter could of course be expected to
ask for all the free help they could get. When LA area law enforcement agencies continued to send new requests for
military support instead of reducing the support it was already receiving, JTF-LA used the mission validation process
to begin canceling current missions.
Already unhappy with the federal commander's denial of most support requests--in sharp contrast to the CANG's
acceptance of almost all missions while in a state status--law enforcement officials were further upset by JTF-LA's
drawdown procedure. The police understood that the military had to go home sometime; after all, by 6 May the LAPD
itself had ended mandatory overtime and returned to normal pre-riot shifts. Unfortunately, law enforcement priorities
were not taken into account when selecting missions to be canceled, which meant that neither the police nor the
supporting units had adequate time to adjust to the changes. The perception of exclusion from the decisionmaking
process created tremendous frustration among law enforcement leaders.
An alternative process would have established cancellation criteria, similar to approval criteria, that would inform
police that the military would no longer perform certain mission types after a specific time and date. Similarly, the JTF
could have informed law enforcement leaders that it would reduce its level of operations by a certain percentage each
day, asking them to choose the specific mission or mission types to be eliminated. Instead, the JTF headquarters simply
declined to revalidate some of the ongoing missions each day without any apparent reason for individual decisions. It
appeared to many participants that the JTF headquarters insisted on total control of all decisions regarding military
support without soliciting input from subordinate units, liaison officers, or the supported law enforcement agencies.[37]

. The single most contentious issue following federalization, however, was the designation of arming orders. An
attachment to the rules of engagement, arming orders prescribed the readiness condition of individual weapons during
the crisis. The arming orders specified six individual readiness postures ranging from AO-1--rifle at sling arms,
bayonet in its scabbard, magazine in the ammunition pouch, and chamber empty--to the highest level, AO-6. In this
posture, each soldier's rifle was to be at port arms, bayonet fixed, magazine in the weapon, and a round in the
chamber. In actuality, even at the highest levels of arming order, soldiers kept their bayonets on their belts because the
bayonets were both useless during the riots and dangerous to oneself and to other soldiers. The controversy concerned
whether soldiers should routinely keep a magazine in their weapons, which constituted an AO-5 arming order.
The JTF-LA commander ordered soldiers to remain at AO-1 unless they were responding to an immediate specific
threat that required a higher arming order. However, most soldiers on the street--and the police officers they were
supporting--believed that merely being in uniform in LA following the riots required a higher state of readiness than
AO-1. In the event, the JTF staff believed that their arming order was consistently violated. Their impression was
probably correct, for the vast majority of deployed National Guard soldiers kept a magazine in their weapons. Despite
repeated admonitions from the JTF headquarters, National Guard officers and senior NCOs left it to the troops on the
ground to determine the appropriate arming order. They had tacitly decided to risk an accidental discharge or
unjustified shooting rather than have a soldier killed while trying to load his weapon. In the deployment to Bosnia,
similar concern for soldier safety is called force protection.
Operational Control Versus Tactical Initiative
The tension created by two opposing requirements for operational success--commanders need to influence the battle,
yet subordinates need freedom of action to win the fight--appears as well in operations to support civil authorities.
American operational doctrine, still designed to fight numerically superior but tactically inflexible Soviet forces,
resolves the dilemma of control versus freedom of action largely in favor of freedom of action. Great value is placed
on initiative at even the lowest echelons. According to FM 100-5, Operations, "initiative requires a willingness and
ability to act independently within the framework of the commander's intent."[38] The commander's statement of intent
helps subordinate leaders focus their own actions on higher-level objectives without additional guidance should the
situation suddenly change. Mission-type orders tell subordinate units what to do, not how to do it.

A commander must be able to coordinate the actions of various subordinate units and change the battle plan as the
situation evolves; his assumed broad view of the situation helps him ensure that tactical engagements support his
operational objectives. Nonetheless, tactical units in combat must be able to exercise the initiative to exploit
opportunities or react immediately when the adversary does something unexpected. Commanders who attempt to
micromanage may inadvertently lose the battle by trying to win the fight; one outcome is that the adversary may
acquire an opportunity to operate inside the friendly decision cycle. Units required to wait for explicit instructions
could be frozen in time and space; an adversary astute enough to sense or discover this situation will close gaps in his
defense or abruptly attack to exploit local opportunities.
Operations other than war, however, seem to add a new consideration to tradeoffs between operational control and
tactical initiative. Commanders in such operations may feel obligated to exercise a degree of control that would be
highly unusual (and cognitively unfeasible) in combat. For example, Joint Task Force-Los Angeles, the equivalent of a
division-level headquarters, commanded by an active component major general, and with three brigades in the field,
sought to manage activities at the very bottom of the chain of command. Brigade and battalion commanders were
given only the slightest discretion in executing their assigned tasks as JTF-LA attempted to control the placement of
individual squads. One explanation for this extreme centralization of control may lie in the ambiguous relationship
during OOTW between tactical action and desired operational or strategic outcomes. This ambiguity could be
encouraging commanders to increase control when the situation and mission may instead call for greater autonomy for
subordinate units.
The actions of a single small unit during combat have been known to influence the outcome of a battle, but it would be
highly unusual for one squad to be responsible for losing a campaign. During OOTW, however, the misconduct or
mistakes or ineptitude of a handful of troops might negate the achievements of an entire brigade. Because public
perception plays such a large role in determining the outcome of an OOTW mission, small-unit actions in such
missions appear to have a significant potential for large-scale effects. So, while the operational or strategic
consequences of small-unit actions during war are likely to be limited, the relative importance of the actions of
individual soldiers and squads may be a unique feature of OOTW.
Among the factors that can contribute to a commander's perceived need for exercising an abnormal amount of control
are the difficulty of monitoring the progress of an operation and the potential for large-scale effects from individual
actions. And while success in OOTW is usually measured by results less tangible than enemy forces destroyed or
terrain secured, both war and OOTW ultimately serve political ends. The link between military action and the political
purpose in OOTW, however, can be tenuous: how do we define victory or even success? Especially during domestic
operations, success is likely to be measured by subjective perceptions of the public; victory may have no meaning at
all. As Major General William Nash, former commander of US forces in Bosnia, has pointed out, "If my Achilles heel
is the low tolerance of the American people for casualties, then I have to recognize that my success or failure is
directly affected by that."[39]
Failures at the tactical level by the CANG before and during deployment quickly produced political consequences at
the operational level. But the real problems occurred well before the emergency, when the CANG and LA area law
enforcement agencies failed to identify the functions that the CANG would perform in case of a mass civil disturbance;
similarly, there was a perception that it was not necessary to establish and coordinate procedures by which law
enforcement agencies could request military support. Furthermore, once the CANG was called to duty, a delay of
several hours in transporting ammunition from the supply point to troop staging areas probably nurtured a premature,
and hence misinformed, public impression that the CANG's response was a failure.
Inept conduct of public affairs exacerbated the misperception. Without the accurate information that could have been
provided to them, the media reported only the relative absence of military personnel in the riot area. While the mayor
of LA and the governor were calling for yet more troops, 1000 CANG troops were actually on the streets, 1000 more
were ready for deployment and waiting in staging areas for support requests from law enforcement, and 2000 more
were reporting to armories. Uncertain as to the progress of the CANG force deployment, the mayor and governor
seemed driven to their decisions by media reports. The resulting widespread perception of inadequacy ultimately led
the governor to replace the adjutant general. More important, questions about the performance of the CANG (and
LAPD) at least temporarily reduced public confidence in the ability of the government to protect their lives and

property.
The CANG's initial difficulties, plus the inherent uncertainties associated with military support for civil disturbance
operations, seem in turn to have set the stage for micromanagement by JTF-LA, after the CANG had been federalized
and active component troops arrived. Because the riots had dissipated by the time active component forces deployed,
the unusual degree of control exercised by the JTF-LA headquarters had only a marginal effect on the ability of
subordinate units to accomplish their missions. Yet if JTF-LA's procedures had been in place at the outbreak of the
riots, the value of military support to law enforcement could have been substantially reduced. The level of control
exercised by JTF-LA would have made mission accomplishment unnecessarily difficult.
This article asks questions of anyone who must develop or respond to requests for military support to civil authorities
during civil disturbances. Judgments about the causes of unreadiness within the National Guard and of discord among
the National Guard, their counterparts in local and state police organizations, and the active forces that eventually
were involved may appear to some to be unfair, even unjustifiably harsh. It is only by trying to get to ground truth in
such matters, however, that we can hope to improve our ability to respond to future requests for support. Personal or
organizational values that deny the need for cooperation between the National Guard and local police, that reject
serious contingency planning, or that refuse to allocate resources needed to coordinate and rehearse those plans are
impediments that have to be overcome in the interest of effectiveness and efficiency. Average citizens will be the
beneficiaries of improvements such as those proposed in this article and others that may follow. That is, after all, part
of why they pay us--to learn and to improve.
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